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Abstract
Constant interest rate (CIR) projections are often criticized on the
grounds that they are inconsistent with the existence of a unique equi-
librium in a variety of forward-looking models. This note shows how
to construct CIR projections that are not subject to that criticism,
using a standard New Keynesian model as a reference framework.
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Constant interest rate (CIR) projections (i.e. forecasts conditional on the
assumption of an unchanged interest rate) have been for some time one of
the tools used by in￿ ation targeting central banks to base their decisions
and to explain the latter to the public.1 Such projections, however, have
been criticized on the grounds that they are based on an assumption about
future policy that is inconsistent with the existence of unique equilibrium in
a variety of forward-looking models, including the new vintage of optimizing
models commonly used for monetary policy analysis.2
An approach that has been proposed in the literature to overcome that
problem consists of assuming an interest rate rule that guarantees a unique
equilibrium while assuming the presence of "exogenous" shocks to the rule
taking the values needed to keep the interest rate constant during the period
considered. A potential problem with that rule is that the shocks the size
and pattern of the shocks required to keep the interest rate constant may
be implausible or hard to reconcile with the assumption of rational expecta-
tions.3
The purpose of the present note is to illustrate, in the context of a canon-
ical version of the New Keynesian model, how CIR projections can be com-
puted, in a way consistent with the model, while guaranteeing a unique
equilibrium and without the need to rely on exogenous policy shocks. In
particular, we show how a version of a Taylor interest rate rule that has the
central bank respond to both in￿ ation and output growth with coe¢ cients
that satisfy a certain proportionality condition can guarantee a unique equi-
librium characterized by a constant nominal rate, and can thus be the basis
of CIR projections.
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 revisits the basic problem
of indeterminacy under an interest rate peg and discusses its consequences
for CIR projections. Section 3 presents and analyzes a rule that overcomes
1Thus, for instance, CIR projections constituted the base-case projections presented in
the In￿ ation Reports of the Bank of England until August 2004 and, until very recently,
those of of the Sveriges Riksbank as well.
2See, e.g., Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) and Woodford (2005) for a discussion of the
problem of indeterminacy under an interest rate peg in the context of the New Keynesian
model. An early statement of that problem in the context of a simple ad-hoc macro model
can be found in Sargent and Wallace (1975).
3See, e.g. Leeper and Zha (2003) and Waggoner and Zha (1999) for a discussion of that
approach and its shortcomings.
1the indeterminacy problem. Section 4 o⁄ers some caveats and concluding
remarks.
2 Constant Interest Rate Projections and the
Curse of Indeterminacy
In this section we describe the nature of the problem associated with constant
interest rate policies and, as a result, with the projections based on those
policies. We start by brie￿ y reviewing the canonical New Keynesian model
that will serve us as a reference framework.
2.1 A Baseline Model
The model is a baseline version of the New Keynesian framework used in
much recent work in monetary economics. The non-policy block of the model
is made up of the following two equations:
yt = Etfyt+1g ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Etf￿t+1g ￿ ￿) (1)
￿t = ￿ Etf￿t+1g + ￿ xt (2)
where yt denotes (log) output, it is the short term nominal interest rate,
￿t ￿ pt ￿ pt￿1 is the rate of in￿ ation between t ￿ 1 and t (with pt denoting
the log of the price level), and xt ￿ yt ￿ yn
t is the output gap (i.e. the log
deviation of output from its natural level yn
t ). Equation (1) can be obtained
by log-linearizing the representative household￿ s Euler equation, and impos-
ing a market clearing condition requiring that consumption equals output at
all times. Equation (2) is a version of the so-called New Keynesian Phillips
curve, which can be derived by aggregating the price-setting decisions of
monopolistically competitive ￿rms subject to Calvo-type constraints on the
frequency of price adjustment, combined with standard assumptions on tech-
nology and labor markets. In that context, parameter ￿ corresponds to the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿ is the household￿ s discount factor (with
￿ ￿ ￿log￿ being the corresponding discount rate), and ￿ is a coe¢ cient
which is inversely related to the degree of price rigidities.4
4The reader is referred to King and Wolman (1996), Woodford (2003) or Gal￿ (2008)
for a detailed description of the model and a derivation of its key equations.
2We can rewrite (1) in terms of the output gap, as follows:
xt = Etfxt+1g ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Etf￿t+1g ￿ ￿) + Etf￿y
n
t+1g (3)
Henceforth we assume that (log) natural output follows a stationary
AR(1) process in ￿rst di⁄erences, i.e.
￿y
n
t = ￿y ￿y
n
t￿1 + "t
where ￿y 2 [0;1) and f"tg is a white noise process. The evolution of yn
t
summarizes the impact of a variety of exogenous real forces impinging on the
economy.
2.2 Constant Interest Rate Policies and Equilibrium
Indeterminacy
Given a path for the nominal interest rate, any non-explosive solution to
the system of di⁄erence equations (2) and (3) constitutes an equilibrium of
our model economy. Thus, one would think that a natural approach to the
construction of CIR projections at any ￿nite horizon, as of period t (which is
taken to be the period when the projection is made), would require solving
for fxt+k; ￿t+kg given a hypothetical constant interest rate path it+k = i




t , all for k = 0;1;2;:::
The di¢ culty with that approach has to do with the fact that if we set the
nominal interest rate equal to a constant, the system of di⁄erence equations
(2)-(3) has a multiplicity of solutions.5 To see this note that if we substitute
the "rule" it+k = i into (3), we can write the equilibrium conditions from


























5This will also be the case if the nominal interest rate varies as a function of exogenous
shocks only or if it responds too weakly to some endogenous variables.
3and where b ￿t+k ￿ ￿t+k￿(it￿￿) and b xt+k = xt+k￿￿￿1(1￿￿)(i￿￿) represent
the deviations of in￿ ation and the output gap from their steady state values
consistent with a constant nominal rate i.
Iterating forward on (4), we see that the CIR projections for the output






















Thus, in order for the CIR projections at any k￿horizon to be well de-
￿ned, the current values of b xt and b ￿t must be determined uniquely. But that
requires that the solution to (4) exist and be unique, for which a necessary
and su¢ cient condition is that the two eigenvalues of A0 lie within the unit
circle, given that both b xt+k and b ￿t+k are non-predetermined variables (see,
e.g. Blanchard and Kahn (1980)).6 The following lemma shows that the
previous condition is not satis￿ed.
Lemma 1 Let ￿1 and ￿2 denote the eigenvalues of A0, where ￿1 ￿ ￿2. Both
￿1 and ￿2 are real and satisfy 0 < ￿1 < 1 < ￿2.
Proof : see appendix.
It follows from Lemma 1 that a multiplicity of non-explosive solutions to
(4) exist, implying that the equilibrium values b xt and b ￿t are not uniquely
determined. Given (5), the CIR projections Etfb xt+kg and Etfb ￿t+kg are not
uniquely determined either.
3 Constant Interest Rate Projections with-
out the Curse of Indeterminacy
Consider next an interest rate rule of the form
b it+k = ￿ (b ￿t+k + ￿ ￿yt+k) (6)
6Throughout the present paper the analysis is restricted to equilibria in a neighborhood
of the steady state being considered. See Benhabib, Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2001) for a
critical view of that approach, and an example of global multiplicity of equilibria coexisting
with local uniqueness.
4for k = 0;1;2;:::where b it+k ￿ it+k ￿ i and, as before, b ￿t+k ￿ ￿t+k ￿ (i ￿ ￿).
We assume ￿ is a constant coe¢ cient satisfying ￿ > 1.7 Combining (6) with





Under our assumption that ￿ > 1 the only non-explosive solution to (7)
is b it+k = 0 for k = 0;1;2;:::Equivalently, by following rule (6) from period t
onward the central bank supports a constant interest rate policy
it+k = i
for k = 0;1;2;:::.for any interest rate i ￿ 0 of its choice.
The equilibrium dynamics under (6) from period t onward are described
by (2), which we rewrite here in terms deviations from means as
b ￿t+k = ￿ Et+kfb ￿t+k+1g + ￿ b xt+k (8)
together with
b xt+k = Et+kfb xt+k+1g￿
1
￿




The previous equilibrium conditions can be obtained by combining (3)
with (6), together with the de￿nition of the output gap and our assumption
on the process followed by yn














5 + B ￿y
n
t+k (10)






















7See Gal￿ (2003) for a comparison of the welfare implications of such a rule relative to
other simple rules.
5Given that the system (10) involves two non-predetermined and one pre-
determined variables, it has a unique non-explosive solution if and only if two
eigenvalues of A lie inside, and one outside, the unit circle. The following
proposition establishes a necessary and su¢ cient condition for that property
to hold.
Proposition 2 A necessary an su¢ cient condition for (10) to have a unique
non-explosive solution is given by ￿ > 1










































2 . Using the
same logic as in the proof of Lemma 1 we conclude that both ￿1 and ￿2 are
real, and satisfy the inequality 0 < ￿1 < 1 < ￿3. Thus, as long as ￿ > 1, two
eigenvalues of A lie inside, and one outside, the unit circle. QED.
Next we show how CIR projections can be computed. We note ￿rst that
under the CIR rule we must have b ￿t+k + ￿ ￿yt+k = 0 or, equivalently,
b ￿t+k = ￿￿ (￿b xt+k + ￿y
n
t+k) (11)
for k = 0;1;2;::: 8
Substituting the previous expression into (8) we obtain, after some alge-
braic manipulation, the second order di⁄erence equation
b xt+k = a b xt+k￿1 + a￿ Et+kfb xt+k+1g ￿ a(1 ￿ ￿￿y) ￿y
n
t+k






. The corresponding station-
ary solution is given by
b xt+k = ￿ b xt+k￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿y
n
t+k (12)
8Note that in the case of logarithmic consumption utility (￿ = 1), the rule considered





2a￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿ =
￿(1￿￿￿y)
1￿￿￿￿y 2 (0;1).
Combining (11) and (12) we can obtain the stationary solution for in￿ a-
tion under the unchanged interest rate policy
















for k = 0;1;2;:::where
C ￿
￿








Note that the equilibrium dynamics of in￿ ation and the output gap are in-
dependent of the particular choice of coe¢ cient ￿ by the monetary authority,
as long as ￿ > 1.
Let Etf￿t+kjig and Etfxt+kjig denote the CIR projection for in￿ ation and
the output gap, at a k-period horizon, given the constant interest rate i ￿ 0.





























and where ￿ ￿ i ￿ ￿ and x ￿ ￿￿1(1 ￿ ￿)(i ￿ ￿) are the steady state values
of in￿ ation and the output gap consistent with a constant interest i. The
previous expression makes it clear that the CIR projections are well de￿ned
and unique, for any horizon k ￿ 0.
More generally, one can show that the equilibrium of the basic New Key-
nesian model considered here will be determinate if the central bank follows
an interest rate rule of the form
b it+k = ￿ b ￿t+k + ￿ ￿yt+k (14)
as long as ￿ > 1, i.e. as long as the central bank adjusts the interest rate
more than one-for-one in response to changes in in￿ ation, thus satisfying the
so-called Taylor principle. Rule (6) is a particular case of (14) corresponding
7to ￿ = ￿￿, and for which the implied nominal rate remains constant in
equilibrium, as shown above. One should emphasize, however, that it is
important for the central bank to make its policy rule transparent, for it
is the public￿ s perception that the central bank will respond to in￿ ation
￿ uctuations that makes the equilibrium determinate.
4 Summary and Caveats
The present paper has shown, in the context of a baseline New Keynesian
model, the possibility of pursuing a monetary policy characterized by a con-
stant nominal interest rate, without that policy leading to a multiplicity of
equilibria. The existence of a unique equilibrium associated with any given
constant nominal rate makes it possible to construct forecasts of any variable
conditional on a given choice of that rate, i.e. constant interest rate (CIR)
projections. Thus, our analysis provides a counterexample to concerns of-
ten found in the literature about the feasibility of those projections. Those
concerns are expressed on the grounds that in a variety of forward-looking
models (including the one used here) constant interest rate policies are as-
sociated with an indeterminate equilibrium and, hence, with the lack of a
well de￿ned projection of any macroeconomic variable conditional on a given
constant level of the interest rate.
Of course, solving the problem of indeterminacy does not automatically
make CIR projections desirable as a tool to help inform policy decisions. A
discussion of their potential usefulness, however, falls beyond the scope of
the present paper, which has focused on the narrower issue of whether they
are well de￿ned at all. But there is one feature that may be worth pointing
out, and that would seem to make those CIR projections unappealing at
least to an in￿ ation targeting central bank: in most monetary models there
is generally only one level of the nominal interest rate that is consistent
with a given long-run in￿ ation target, so it is not clear why the central
bank would want to consider the implications of policies involving a constant
interest rate path at a level di⁄erent from the one consistent with the desired
target for in￿ ation. A possible response to that concern is that in practice
a central bank would never intend to keep the nominal rate constant forever
(at whichever level is being considered), but only for a ￿nite amount of
time (e.g. until the reference horizon for the projections), and then revert
back to some rule that would be consistent with the desired in￿ ation target.
8But it should be clear that, in a forward-looking model, neither current
nor projected outcomes will be invariant to the speci￿c rule to which the
central bank is assumed to revert at some point in the future, even if the
latter is not expected to be in place until after the horizon date for the
projections. Hence, the speci￿cation of a constant interest rate path would
have to be supplemented with a description of the rule that will eventually
replace it and a speci￿cation of the timing of that replacement. Needless
to say, the introduction of policy switches of that kind could complicate the
analysis considerably, but it would lead to CIR projections consistent with
an unchanged long-run in￿ ation target.
9Appendix
Proof of Lemma
From the properties of matrices and their eigenvalues, we have tr(A0) =
1 + ￿ + ￿












2 . Note that





> (1 + ￿)
2 ￿ 4￿
= (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (15)








(1 + ￿ + ￿
￿)2 ￿ 4￿ < 1 + ￿ + ￿
￿ , from which we have
￿1 > 0. Finally, ￿1 < 1 follows from the fact that lim ￿
￿!0 ￿1 = ￿ < 1, and
@￿1
@(￿=￿) < 0. QED.
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